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I. INTRODUCTION 
The conclusion of the EU Insolvency Regulation,1 after 
negotiations on earlier versions had languished for nearly forty years, 
has been described as “one of the finest achievements of European 
jurisprudence.”2 The success of the recent referendum in the United 
Kingdom to exit the European Union (Brexit)3 puts this important law 
at risk. That the United Kingdom initially declined to sign on to a 
draft convention on which the original EU Insolvency Reg was based 
might raise questions as to whether preservation of this Reg is 
consistent with British interests going forward.4 But the loss of 
Community-wide agreement on the recognition and treatment of 
insolvency proceedings would be a great tragedy, and not just a 
European tragedy. The loss of the EU Insolvency Reg would hurt the 
United Kingdom, as well. 
This paper argues both that retention of the EU Insolvency Reg 
would strongly benefit the interests of the United Kingdom, and that 
                                                                                                                                  
1.  See generally Council Regulation 1346/2000/EC on insolvency proceedings, 2000 
O.J. L 160/1, art. 46, at 160/13 [hereinafter EU Insolvency Reg or EU Reg, as clarity permits]. 
2.  Personal correspondence with Philip Wood (on file with the editors of the Fordham 
International Law Journal).   
3.  Brexit is a snappy moniker, but really it is the United Kingdom and not just Great 
Britain that is a member of the European Union; the difference between the two involves 
Northern Ireland, whose interests in the issue of “UKexit” might well be different from that of 
the interests of Great Britain on Brexit. This paper nonetheless ignores the distinct issues 
raised by Northern Ireland. It also (perhaps confusingly) uses the terms British as an adjective 
referring to the United Kingdom, with apologies to Northern Ireland. 
4.  Although Brexit has been described as motivated mostly by fears that immigrants 
and asylum seeking were crowding Britain and that the UK’s continued membership in the 
European Union would preclude it from cutting back on free mobility of entry to the United 
Kingdom, issues distinct from those involved in the EU Insolvency Reg, the Brexit vote might 
also be characterized as a referendum on free trade within Europe, as well as on dissatisfaction 
over-intrusive regulatory instincts emanating out of Brussels. Many are hoping out loud for a 
“soft” Brexit, especially on issues of trade and regulation, but the outcome of these 
negotiations remain unclear.  See Financial Times, Mehreen Khan, What Next for Brexit?  UK 
election throws uncertainty on Tory EU exit plans (June 8, 2017), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/20ddec22-eed6-3c46-9989-85e735c68213. .   
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its retention or replication will be exceedingly difficult to achieve. In 
building the case that the EU Reg serves important British interests, I 
retell the chronology of its adoption. The story of British accession to 
the terms of the original EU Insolvency Regulation is complicated by 
the fact that the terms of the EU Reg are the product of negotiations 
on three earlier draft conventions on the same topic. The story of 
British implementation of the original EU Reg is further complicated 
and perhaps clarified by its denouement: this regulation included an 
obligation to study the effects of its implementation ten years after its 
entry into force and possibly to revise its terms after reflection on this 
study;5 as a result, the original EU Reg has recently been revised by 
the EU Parliament.6 British fingerprints on the contents of these 
revisions suggest that the United Kingdom should try, to the greatest 
extent possible, to remain committed to the core principles set out in 
the revised EU Insolvency Regulation.7 But it will be difficult for the 
United Kingdom to accomplish the core benefits of this Regulation – 
automatic recognition and enforcement across Europe – after Brexit 
and when going it alone. Cross-border recognition is possibly 
meaningless in the absence of enforcement, and enforcement sits in 
tension with complete “independence” from the European Union. 
In the text that follows, Part I describes negotiations over what 
subsequently became the original EU Insolvency Regulation. There 
are four subparts to this section because the EU Reg was adopted after 
three earlier tries to draft and implement a European-wide convention 
on the same topic. To supplement secondary literature, since little of 
this focuses explicitly on British involvement in the making of this 
regulation, I draw on reports from various British government and 
private actors analyzing whether accession to a cross-border 
insolvency convention or regulation was consistent with British 
interests. These reports highlight distinctly British concerns that were 
not always telegraphed in the secondary literature commenting on 
                                                                                                                                  
5.  See EU Reg, supra note 1, art. 46, at 160/13. 
6.  See generally European Parliament and Council Regulation 2015/848/EU on 
insolvency proceedings, 2015 O.J. L 141/19 [hereinafter “revised EU Insolvency Reg”].  The 
effective date on this revision had been delay to Jun 30, 2017, see id. art. 84, at 56, but the 
revised EU Insolvency Reg has now entered into effect throughout the European Union, 
including the United Kingdom.  See infra Parts IV and V.   
7.  But there is a big difference between a regulation that binds all multilateral signators, 
and unilateral domestic legislation that looks to copy its terms. For discussion of the pros and 
cons of such “me-too” domestic legislation, see generally John F. Coyle, Incorporative 
Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655 (2010). 
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these drafts, including that written by British academics and 
practitioners. Part II considers the decisions of British courts when 
asked to implement the original EU Insolvency Regulation. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this case law shows that, from the moment the EU Reg 
entered into effect, British insolvency practitioners argued and courts 
agreed that the EU Reg allowed coordination of insolvency 
proceedings in ways that, before accession to the Reg, had been 
described as prohibited and thus a shortcoming of that regulation. 
British courts succeeded, in other words, in interpreting the EU Reg 
to resolve concerns that had been raised before accession and, with 
this construction, to further British interests. Next, Part III traces the 
influence of this British case law and insolvency practice on recent 
revision to the EU Insolvency Reg.8 It finds that the practical victories 
that had been achieved in British courts were successfully touted 
within the European Commission and later the European Parliament 
as time-tested and ready for implementation across the Continent. 
British implementation of the original EU Insolvency Reg got 
“codified” in the revised EU Reg. Part IV reflects on the implications 
of this experience for European cross-border insolvency practices 
post-Brexit. 
II. THREE DRAFT CONVENTIONS AND A REGULATION 
Unified economic markets require coordination and mutual 
recognition of judgments. In the absence of coordination of 
recognition and enforcement of judicial proceedings, commercial 
actors face enormous uncertainty, potentially undermining otherwise 
unfettered trade in markets. The Treaty of Rome, which first mapped 
out the contours of the project of creating a united European 
Community, commits member states to negotiate a range of 
conventions for the benefit of their nationals, including one to secure 
“the simplification of formalities of governing the reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgments of court or tribunals . . . 
.”9 
                                                                                                                                  
8.  Article 46 of the original EU Reg stipulated that the Commission should review 
practices under the regulation and propose needed revisions beginning in 2012. See EU Reg, 
supra note 1. 
9.  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 220, 
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].  For the complete text of the Treaty of Rome, 
see Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat 
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Private international law conventions (PIL conventions),10 
although governing only procedural topics, are not apolitical;11 
international agreement within Europe on matters of jurisdiction, 
choice of law and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
required concessions of sovereignty no less significant than with 
international agreement on issues of legal substance. The 1968 
Brussels Convention concerning Judicial Competence and the 
Execution of Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters took ten 
years to negotiate; in order to reach agreement in this relatively short 
period of time (at least short in terms of the time taken to negotiate 
PIL conventions),12 negotiators carved out several difficult issues for 
subsequent resolution. As with other PIL conventions, the Brussels 
Convention excludes bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings from its 
                                                                                                                                  
of the United Nations, Vol. 298, I. No. 4302 (1958), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/
publication/unts/volume%20298/v298.pdf. 
10.  PIL conventions regulate private relationships across national borders, and nearly 
uniformly are limited to procedural topics, such as jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
11.  See generally HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, THE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1951). 
12.  The first four Hague Conferences on Private International Law (1893, 1894, 1900, 
1904) resulted in six treaties dealing with civil procedure (1896), the conclusion of marriages 
(1900), choice of law and jurisdiction in matters of divorce and judicial separation (1900), 
guardianship of minors (1900), the personal and proprietary relationships between spouses 
(1904), and compulsory guardianship of adults (1904). From 1904 to 1925, the work on 
private international law was on a halt, and between 1925 to the end of the Second World War, 
discussions and debates resulted only in a protocol accepting the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice for the interpretation of the Hague Conventions. It was only after 
1951 that conventions on procedure, family matters, succession, commercial matters, torts, and 
conflict of laws were regularly negotiated and went into force. See generally Kurt Lipstein, 
One Hundred Years of Hague Conferences on Private International Law, 42 INT’L & COMP. L. 
Q. 553 (1993). Despite working for years, the Hague Conference has not completed its draft 
PIL convention on the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial law matters, 
although it continues working on this project. See Working Group on the Judgments Project, 
Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Prel. Doc. 
No. 1 (Apr. 2016), available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/01adb7d9-13f3-4199-b1d3-
ca62de79360f.pdf.  
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scope.13 The EU Insolvency Regulation is thus understood to fill in 
gaps intentionally set out in the Brussels Convention.14 
European negotiations on filling in the gap left by the 
bankruptcy carve-out in the Brussels Convention would span more 
than thirty years after completion of the general convention on 
enforcement of judgments. There were at least three different 
European bankruptcy conventions drafted to remedy this hole before 
the European Union settled finally on the EU Insolvency Regulation. 
The following sections detail all four stages, focusing specifically on 
British involvement in those negotiations and British reaction to the 
drafts. 
A. The EEC Draft Convention 
By 1960, even before negotiations on the Brussels Convention 
were completed, work on a draft European convention on cross-
border insolvency procedures had begun. But this quick start on 
negotiations did not produce quick resolution. Negotiations within the 
European Economic Community (EEC) Commission did not produce 
a preliminary draft until 1970,15 although during that period the EEC 
included only six member states and did not include the United 
Kingdom.16 
When the United Kingdom (and Ireland and Denmark) later 
joined the EEC in 1973, they agreed in principle to accede to 
conventions that already had been agreed to by the original six 
                                                                                                                                  
13.  See generally Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 1(2), 1262 U.N.T.S. 153, as amended by 
various Accession Conventions [hereinafter Brussels Convention] (expressly declaring that the 
Convention shall not apply to “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent 
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous 
proceedings”). 
14.  See Hamed Alavi and Tatsiana Khamionchonak, A Step Forward In The 
Harmonization Of European Jurisdiction: Regulation Brussels I Recast, 8 BALTIC J. L. & POL. 
161, 169 (2015)(discussing relationship between Brussels Convention, including Brussels 
Regulation I and II, and EU Insolvency Regulation). 
15.  See generally Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for 
the Internal Market and Approximation of Legislation, Report on the Convention Relating to 
Bankruptcies, Compositions and Analogous Procedures, 16.775/XIV/70-E (1970) (written by 
Jean Noel, Conseiller a la Cour, and Jacques Lemontey, Magistrat au Minstere de la Justice, 
France) [hereinafter Noel-Lemontey Report]. 
16.  French Prime Minister de Gaulle blocked UK membership twice in the 1960s. 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973 after Charles De Gaulle’s 
resignation in 1969. 
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member states,17 and to become immediately involved in negotiations 
on draft conventions.18 The British government quickly sought expert 
advice on the preliminary draft convention on bankruptcy.19 The 
Secretary of State for Trade created a six-person committee to review 
the preliminary draft convention, and appointed Lord Kenneth Cork 
as chairman of this committee. In its 1976 report, the Advisory 
Committee advised Parliament that, on the whole, the preliminary 
draft convention was “of real value.”20 As a result, the United 
Kingdom quickly joined in negotiations that produced a revised draft 
in 1980, and additional revisions in 1982 and 1984 (together the EEC 
Draft).21 Despite more than a dozen years of work, by the time of this 
last revision it was clear that there was insufficient support and the 
EEC Draft was scrapped before seeking the signature of member 
states.22 
The EEC Draft was abandoned because many – both inside the 
United Kingdom and on the Continent – thought it was too ambitious 
and unrealistic in its goals. The Draft sought guarantees of both 
universality (that is, agreement that bankruptcies within Europe 
would be mutually recognized by all member states) and of unity (that 
is, agreement that a bankruptcy opened in one member state would 
bar all other member states from opening another proceeding); it also 
                                                                                                                                  
17.  See Kurt H. Nadelmann, A Reflection on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the 
European Common Market, the United States and Canada, 27 REV. DE DROIT MCGILL 541, 
542 (1982) (referring specifically to the Brussels Convention). 
18.  Id. (discussing involvement in negotiations on the 1970 preliminary draft 
convention on bankruptcy). 
19.  See generally Report of the Advisory Committee, The EEC Preliminary Draft 
Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions, and Similar 
Proceedings, Presented to Parliament by the Secy of State for Trade by Command of Her 
Majesty, Cmnd. 6602 (August 1976) [hereinafter Cork Report]. 
20.  Id. at 101, ¶ 411. The Cork Report did not view the preliminary EEC Draft as 
perfect. Id. at 100-03, ¶¶ 407-21. The Advisory Committee had collected comments from 
numerous professionals and professional associations and remarked on the specifics of some of 
this commentary, many of which were negative. Id. at 101-03, ¶¶ 412-21. Further, one member 
of the Advisory Committee wrote separately in the Cork Report to express his disagreement 
with the indirect jurisdictional provisions in the Draft. Id. at 105-28 (Note of reservation by 
Mr. A.E. Anton). 
21.  Nadelmann notes that criticisms to the preliminary draft found in a Note of 
Reservation to the Cork Report led directly to changes in the 1982 and 1984 versions of the 
EEC Draft. See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 543. 
22.  See, e.g., Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 485, 490-92 (1996) (describing history of EEC Draft). See 
also Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27 INT’L LAW. 
429, 437 (1993) (also describing history of EEC Draft). 
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sought harmonization of substantive aspects of bankruptcy law.23 
Each of these attributes of the EEC Draft was highly controversial 
given broad divergence at the time in the bankruptcy and insolvency 
laws of member states.24 Distinct insolvency laws were not the only 
hurdle to adoption of the EEC Draft. European laws on the treatment 
of secured and priority creditors were also in conflict,25 which meant 
that the unity sought to be achieved through the EEC Draft might 
easily result in economic loss for “local” creditors situated in member 
states outside the state in which the “universal” proceeding was first 
commenced. The Draft came under heavy attack from practitioners 
and quickly died of its own weight.26 
Although the criticism of the EEC Draft that ultimately sank it 
was the complaint that it tried to do too much, there was also a 
realization within the British government that the Draft did not look 
to do enough.27 Insolvent insurance companies and other financial 
service industries sat outside its scope; the Draft also did not address 
the financial problems of multinational corporate groups. It was silent 
on the treatment of insolvency proceedings that straddled European 
member states and “third countries” situated outside Europe, like the 
United States but also like Austria (which did not become a member 
of the European Union for many years) or Norway (which has never 
                                                                                                                                  
23.  See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 4, ¶ 16 (describing preliminary EEC Draft as 
including: “the rule that a declaration of bankruptcy . . . in one Member State will exclude any 
such declaration . . . being subsequently made in any other Member State; the rule that the 
liquidator under such bankruptcy orders has powers which extend to all Member States; rules 
which in broad terms have the effect that most disputed questions arising in the course of 
bankruptcy will be matters for the courts of the State of the bankruptcy and for the law of that 
State, even in relation to immoveable property in other Member States, and rules securing the 
virtually automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to such questions in 
other Member States.”). Moreover, an Annex to the draft contained a proposed Uniform Law 
“dealing inter alia with the bankruptcy of persons responsible for the management of firms or 
companies, relation-back periods and set-off.” Id. ¶ 9. 
24.  For extensive discussion of this dissensus, see Noel-Lemontey Report, supra note 
15, at 60-61, 73-74, 88-91, 102-03, 106-07, 109-10, 116-17, 124-29; Cork Report supra note 
19 at 15-85, ¶¶ 127-28, 140-42, 171, 215-16, 294, 334-37. While there were many differences 
in this regard, two were most emphasized: French insolvency law protected the wage claims of 
a debtor’s employees even above the priority of the debtor’s other priority creditors; British 
administrative receiverships protected a secured creditor’s floating charge to such an extent 
that unsecured creditors were often left empty handed in these proceedings. 
25.  See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 57-67, ¶¶ 244-78. 
26.  See Balz, supra note 22, at 492, nn.26 & 28 (citing to German practitioners and 
academics opposed to the EEC Draft). See also Fletcher, supra note 22, at 437 (1993) 
(explaining failure of EEC Draft as due to its “universalist goals which conflicted with 
political imperatives”). 
27.  See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 17, ¶ 75, and at 51, ¶ 221.   
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become a full member state). Finally, the EEC Draft was narrowly 
focused only on court supervised liquidation-type bankruptcy laws. 
While it would have covered UK laws governing the winding up of 
insolvent companies, it would not have covered UK administrative 
receiverships, for example. 
It is worth emphasizing at this juncture, however, that the British 
government was inclined to support the EEC Draft. British support 
for universality in cross-border recognition of bankruptcy proceedings 
was nothing new,28 and some might say had been “invented” in 1817 
by English courts with the decision in Odwin v. Forbes.29 But British 
universalism was less universal than the European universalism 
proposed in the EEC Draft. Cross-border coordination by British 
courts was not consistently practiced and was more likely to be 
recognized within the British Empire but not more globally or even 
necessarily across the Channel.30 Indeed, when British diplomats 
travelled to the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 
1925 to debate a similar bankruptcy convention31 they walked out 
mid-way through negotiations because they viewed the 1925 draft 
convention as too universal in scope.32 
British support for the principles of universalism and unity set 
out in the EEC Draft is perhaps best explained as political and 
pragmatic, rather than the inevitable product of its commitment to 
universality in bankruptcy practice. 33 As one member of the House of 
                                                                                                                                  
28.  See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Turnaround: Reflections on the Present Day 
Influence of Negotiations on International Bankruptcy at the Fifth Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law in 1925, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 
(2014); see also Lipstein supra note 12, at 553-653. 
29.  See generally Odwin v. Forbes, 1 Buck. 57 (P.C.) (1817) (decision by Jabez Henry). 
See also JABEZ HENRY, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF DEMARARA, IN THE CASE OF 
ODWIN V. FORBES, ON THE PLEA OF THE ENGLISH CERTIFICATE OF BANKRUPTCY IN BAR, IN A 
FOREIGN JURISDICTION, TO THE SUIT OF A FOREIGN CREDITOR AS CONFIRMED IN APPEAL, 
WITH THE AUTHORITIES, AND FOREIGN AND ENGLISH CASES (London 1823). For more 
modern discussions of this case, see IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 1 (2d ed. 2005); David Graham, Discovering Jabez Henry: Cross-
Border Insolvency Law in the Nineteenth Century, 10 INT’L INSOLV. REV. 153 (2001). 
30.  See Leonard Hoffman, Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2507, 2510-12 (1995-1996). 
31.  See Noel-Lemontey Report, supra note 15, at 38-40 (comparing 1970 EEC Draft to 
bankruptcy convention debated at 1925 Hague Conference on Private International Law). 
32.  See Block-Lieb, supra note 28. 
33.  See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 104, ¶ 421 (as the Advisory Committee remarked 
in their Cork Report: “[a]lthough the Convention is unsatisfactory in certain respects, the 
alternative of excluding its effect may be even more so. As the law now is, a creditor often has 
no effective remedies at all in trying to recover a debt from a foreign bankruptcy. The present 
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Lords put it when asked to comment on the Cork Report, the Draft 
had “received the general support” of a wide range of British experts 
who were of the opinion “that this convention is too valuable to throw 
away because of its difficulties.”34 Faint praise, with realpolitik in the 
driver’s seat. First and foremost, the Labor and Tory governments at 
the helm during negotiations on the EEC Draft both viewed 
membership in the European Community as critically important to 
rebuilding the economy of the United Kingdom, which throughout 
this period was in a shambles. Second, there was a feeling that the 
Draft Convention was of more importance on the Continent, where a 
debtor’s assets might well be situated in multiple countries, but was 
likely to “have very little immediate impact” on British insolvency 
practice because at least at the time there were very few bankruptcies 
concerning assets spread outside the United Kingdom35 Trade crossed 
the Channel, but mostly British goods and services sold to 
Continental buyers.36 Because the British government viewed cross-
border bankruptcy enforcement as a problem more likely to arise on 
the Continent, it was willing to live with the EEC Draft, especially 
since accession to its terms was part of the overall price of admission 
to Europe. 
Regardless of its rationale, the willingness of the United 
Kingdom to go along with the EEC Draft was, of itself, insufficient. 
By 1984, it had been shelved without seeking signatures from 
member states. 
B. The Istanbul Convention 
The failure of the EEC Draft did not end progress within Europe 
on agreement on a cross-border insolvency convention. In short order, 
negotiations restarted within the Council of Europe (which then 
                                                                                                                                  
system is so seriously inadequate, that any proposal which seems to offer some kind of 
advantage should be carefully examined.”). 
34.  Remarks of Lord Scarman, ECC 26th Report: Bankruptcy Convention, H.L. Deb, 
vol. 424, cc863-78, 4:38 p.m. (Oct. 22, 1981) (referring to Sir Kenneth Cork, “trouble-shooter-
in-extraordinary,” as well as “Mr. Harper, inspector general of the Insolvency Service in the 
Department of Trade and his deputy Mr. Armstrong”), available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1981/oct22/ecc-26th-report-bankruptcy-convention. 
35.  Cork Report, supra note 19 at 643, ¶ 411. 
36.  A similar argument was made in 1924 to advocate British involvement in the 
negotiations on a bankruptcy treaty at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. See 
Block-Lieb, supra note 28, at 6. 
2017] UK AND EU INSOLVENCY RECOGNITION 1383 
included twenty member states)37 on another European convention to 
coordinate insolvency practices.38 These negotiations completed 
quickly, within five short years. Despite this quick progress much 
changed in Europe, and with the European Communities, during these 
negotiations. Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the ECs in the 1980s. 
Although formation of the European Union and its enlargement to 
include its current 28 member states post-dated these negotiations,39 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unraveling of communism in Eastern 
Europe and eventually the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred as 
the finishing touches were being made on the Council’s draft 
bankruptcy convention. 
Insolvency law reform was also sweeping Europe over this same 
period.40 The United States largely rewrote its federal bankruptcy 
laws in 1979,41 in turn prompting reform proposals within the United 
Kingdom,42 Germany43 and elsewhere in Europe at around the same 
                                                                                                                                  
37.  The Council of Europe was created in the wake of World War II, initially with the 
goal of reconstructing and reorganizing Europe’s economies but soon became involved in 
many important aspects of international law, most notably in human rights. See BIRTE 
WASSENBERG, HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 15 (2013). The Council of Europe is 
currently comprised of forty-seven countries of Europe, twenty-eight of which are members of 
the European Union. Id. at 16. While similar in name, the European Council is distinct from 
the Council of Europe, as the European Council sets the European Union’s policy agenda. See 
In focus, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/ 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
38.  These efforts culminated in the European Convention on Certain International 
Aspects of Bankruptcy (commonly referred to as the “Istanbul Convention”).  See Balz, supra 
note 22, at 492-94 
39.  The European Union was not established until the Maastricht Treaty entered into 
force in 1993.  For the complete text of the Treaty on European Union, see Council of the 
European Communities and Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European 
Union (1992), available at https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/
treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.   
40.  Reform of corporate insolvency laws in the United Kingdom and Germany had 
begun before the political upheavals in Eastern Europe could have been anticipated, but the 
unification of West and East Germany gave additional impetus for reform of German 
insolvency law and, in particular, for political pressure for that law to enable and possibly 
favor corporate reorganization. The preference for adopting insolvency laws favoring 
corporate reorganization would take on speed, first, as Eastern European countries looked to 
privatize their economies after the fall of the Soviet Union and, again, as Europe prepared to 
react preventatively to the Asian Financial Crisis. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Terence 
C. Halliday, Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in Global Commercial Law in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, at ch. 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 
2015). 
41.  US Bankruptcy Code, effective Oct. 28, 1979; replacing Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 
42.  Sir Kenneth Cork’s work to review the EEC Draft for the British government 
prompted him to recommend that England and Wales attempt reform of their domestic 
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time.44 Each of these reforms looked to revise laws that last had been 
enacted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Corporate 
insolvency reform initiatives involved more than simply updating 
longstanding statutory provisions, however. With enactment of 
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, US corporate insolvency law 
enabled and indeed favored the rehabilitation of financially ailing 
businesses. European reforms also looked to facilitate reorganization 
of companies in financial distress. The obvious implication of this 
reform raised questions as to whether the Istanbul Convention should 
enable coordination of corporation reorganizations and not just 
coordination of company liquidation proceedings, even though some 
of these reorganization proceedings might easily be characterized as 
pre-insolvency proceedings. 
The Council draft, completed and opened for signature in 
Istanbul by 1990 (and so usually is referred to as the “Istanbul 
Convention”), differed substantially from the EEC Draft. The Istanbul 
Convention sought neither universality nor unity in insolvency 
practice. Rather than provide for European-wide recognition of 
insolvency proceedings opened in a member state, it would only have 
recognized the standing of the liquidator appointed in a “main” 
insolvency proceeding (that is, a proceeding pending in the member 
state in which the debtor’s center of interests was located) to take 
action elsewhere in Europe. 45 Because it mostly limited the standing 
                                                                                                                                  
bankruptcy and insolvency laws, which had last been revised in 1914. See, e.g., Remarks of 
Lord Scarman, supra note 34; BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING 
BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED 
STATES 113 (1998). Cork’s recommendations on English and Welsh insolvency laws 
culminated in enactment of the Insolvency Act of 1986. Perhaps ironically, although Cork’s 
recommendations on the EEC Draft did not result in coordination of insolvency proceedings 
within Europe, he strongly recommended that British reform efforts promote coordination 
among insolvency courts throughout the Commonwealth, resulting in enactment of section 426 
of the Insolvency Act of 1986. For more detailed discussion of the coordination of 
Commonwealth insolvency proceedings under this British law, see generally Hamish 
Anderson, Corporate Insolvency After the Insolvency Act 1986, 20 BRACTON L.J. 49 (1988). 
43.  The new German Insolvenzordnung replaced the Konkorzordnung of 1877. 
Although the Insolvenzordnung was enacted by the Bundestag in 1994 and went into effect in 
1999, twenty years of discussion, hearings and negotiations had preceded these legislative 
events. See Balz, supra note 22 at 487, n.6. 
44.  See generally Catherine Bridge, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Insolvency – a Second Chance? Why Modern Insolvency Laws Seek to Promote 
Business Rescue, LAW IN TRANSITION 28 (2013), www.ebrd.com/documents/legal-
reform/insolvency-a-second-chance-.pdf.   
45.  A “foreign main liquidator” could seek and would be entitled to receive protective 
measures outside of the debtor’s center of main interests, but these protections were likely to 
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of a “foreign main liquidator” to that authorized under “local” law, 
and explicitly permitted the opening of multiple secondary 
proceedings wherever the debtor held substantial assets, the Istanbul 
Convention would have provided “local” creditors with multiple 
options for getting paid first out of “local” assets. Moreover, the 
Istanbul Convention did not propose a procedure for resolution of 
disputes between national courts, for example as to whether the 
debtor’s center of main interests existed in one or another member 
state, both because it contained only indirect jurisdictional 
commitments,46 and did not provide for the possibility of resolution of 
such disputes (or any other interpretive issues) in the European Court 
of Justice. 
Only seven countries signed the Istanbul Convention and it 
failed to enter into force.47 It was not signed by the United Kingdom. 
This was hardly surprising. Because the Istanbul Convention 
envisioned the opening of multiple territorially limited liquidation 
proceedings, and coordinated these only through recognition of the 
standing of the liquidator in the “main” insolvency proceeding 
elsewhere in Europe, and only then by mostly requiring the “main” 
liquidator to satisfy the requirements of local law, it would have 
accomplished little in the way of coordination. As a result, many 
argued that the draft was inconsistent with the development of a 
unified European market.48 
                                                                                                                                  
be limited to the sorts of protections otherwise available in that distant member state; relief in 
excess of that, such as the remittance of assets to the state in which the main proceeding was 
pending, might have been available, but only after permitting local creditors two months for 
bringing collection actions against such assets. See European Convention on Certain 
International Aspects of Bankruptcy, E.T.S. 136, art. 11 (1990). 
46.  Although the Istanbul Convention did not provide for direct agreement on the 
jurisdiction of any member state to open insolvency proceedings, it did speak indirectly on the 
subject of jurisdiction by limiting automatic recognition to a liquidator appointed in an 
insolvency proceeding commenced where the debtor’s center of main interest is located.  See 
European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, E.T.S. 136, art. 4 
(1990). 
47.  The Istanbul Convention was signed by Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Turkey, with only Cyprus ratifying this treaty. See BOB WESSELS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY MATTERS 87, n.77 
(2009). 
48.  For example, one commentator describes the Istanbul Convention as flawed 
because it would have created a series of sub-estates rather than a single universal proceeding 
and because it would have provided for discriminatory treatment of foreign creditors. See 
Fletcher, supra note 22, at 314-37. 
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This territorial “light touch” on coordination of European 
insolvency proceedings might have been prompted by more than 
simply a reaction to broad dissatisfaction with the utopian goals 
sought to be furthered through the EEC Draft. Faced with an 
expanding list of member states and possible future member states 
whose interests would need to be satisfied with the draft that resulted 
in the Istanbul Convention, negotiators may well have understood 
their project in terms of a need for caution, an emphasis on 
pragmatism over up-to-the-minute reform. 
At the same time, the Istanbul Draft suffered from the same 
timidity as the EEC Draft: it, too, excluded certain regulated 
industries from its scope; it did not address the problem of insolvent 
corporate groups or of the assets of a debtor situated in some “third 
country;” it looked only to coordinate liquidation proceedings,49 
although corporate reorganization was now possible under the UK 
Insolvency Act of 1986 and would soon become possible under 
German legislation that would, by 1994, be enacted as the new 
Insolvenzordnung. 
C. The (Third Draft) European Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings 
A much-altered draft European insolvency convention began to 
emerge in the early 1990s. This third draft convention would not have 
provided Europe the unity and universalism envisioned by the EEC 
Draft, but would have provided far more universality than the Istanbul 
Convention. Like the Istanbul Draft, the third draft would have 
provided for the possibility of a main insolvency proceeding and, in 
theory at least, multiple secondary proceedings. Like the Istanbul 
Convention, a foreign main liquidator’s standing would have been 
recognized throughout Europe. But, unlike the Istanbul Convention, 
this third draft convention also established jurisdictional rules for the 
                                                                                                                                  
49.  Even without this limited reference to the coordination of liquidation proceedings, 
the Istanbul Convention would have made corporate reorganization nearly impossible. 
Whenever a debtor’s assets spanned borders within Europe, the Istanbul Convention would 
have allowed creditors located outside the debtor’s center of main interests to grab assets; this 
protection of local creditors’ interests would have made rescue of a financially troubled 
corporation virtually impossible. Uncertainty over which member state had primary 
jurisdiction because the Convention left the definition of a debtor’s center of main interests 
undefined meant that the prospect of territorial disputes over assets was even more likely to 
render reorganization impossible and potentially even upend all efficiency gains from 
coordination. See Balz, supra note 22, at 493-94. 
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opening of insolvency proceedings within Europe and provided for 
European-wide automatic recognition of the opening of main 
proceedings (in the member state in which the debtor’s center of main 
interests was located) and secondary proceedings (in a member state 
in which the debtor ran an establishment), and the enforcement of 
judgments entered in such proceedings; unlike the Istanbul 
Convention, the third draft also created uniform conflict of law rules 
governing in insolvency proceedings, as well as certain guarantees for 
creditors’ rights to information about, and to lodge claims in, the 
proceedings. 
By late 1995, the draft convention was opened for signature and 
twelve countries quickly signed. The format of the third draft 
convention required member states to accede to its terms within six 
months of its opening,50 but Great Britain lagged behind given its 
internal need for a report on the draft from a select committee of the 
House of Lords.51 The select committee of the House of Lords 
appointed to consider and comment on Community proposals 
(Subcommittee E) collected testimony and reported on the draft 
convention in March 1996. 
Although the Hoffman Report did not oppose accession to the 
draft convention on insolvency proceedings, neither did it offer a 
ringing endorsement of the draft. Thirty years of work resulting in a 
final draft convention “is a major achievement for the [European] 
Community,” remarked the Report, but “[a]ny sense of relief should 
not, however, get in the way of an object and critical appraisal of the 
proposal before any decision on participation in the Convention is 
taken.”52 The Select Committee was quick to emphasize “major 
advantages” in the draft Convention: automatic recognition of UK 
insolvency proceedings and judgments entered in those proceedings,53 
as well as a clear “duty of cooperation between liquidators” and the 
                                                                                                                                  
50.  That is, by May of 1996. The select committee of the House of Lords on European 
Community Proposals, Subcommittee E, collected testimony and issued its report on the third 
draft convention in March 1996, three months before the deadline set in the convention. 
European Community Proposals Select Committee, Subcommittee E, 1996 HL, at 1, ¶¶ 3-4 (L 
Hoffman, Chairman) [hereinafter Hoffman Report]. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 15, ¶ 35. 
53.  Id. ¶ 36. See also id. at 8, ¶ 15 (referring to testimony that this was “the prize” of 
the Convention). 
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right of all creditors to take part in both main and secondary 
proceedings within Europe.54 
The Hoffman Report also raised substantive concerns, however, 
many of which were similar to those raised in the Cork Report as to 
the EEC Draft: The Select Committee was concerned about the 
implications of the Convention “for rescue proceedings,” noting in 
particular that administrative receiverships were not recognized as a 
collective insolvency proceeding within the scope of the draft 
Convention but that, in its favor, “the floating charge under which 
receivers are ordinarily appointed by parties appear to be recognized 
under the Convention as conferring a right in rem” and that “the 
administrative procedure and company and individual voluntary 
arrangements” would be recognized.55 It also critiqued the limited 
scope of the Convention, which excluded credit institutions, insurance 
companies and certain investment undertakings,56 that the draft 
Convention would have only “intra-Community effect,”57 and that it 
would only apply to debtor corporations operating within Europe as 
an establishment which is a branch of the parent company but had “no 
special rules for dealing with the insolvency of groups.”58 The Report 
criticized the lack of definition of the Convention’s primary 
jurisdictional test (the “centre of main interests” or COMI test), and 
added that the “principal disadvantage” of these jurisdictional tests 
“was that of the potential loss of jurisdiction [for British courts], 
[jurisdiction] which is currently exercisable where the debtor has 
assets in the United Kingdom” but neither a center of main interests 
or even an establishment.59 The Report also highlighted three 
objections to the terms of the Convention that had been raised in 
testimony before it from banks and other financial interests, who 
complained about the Convention’s treatment of floating charges, 
contractual netting and set-off rights, and other protections, which 
                                                                                                                                  
54.  Id. at 15, ¶ 36. 
55.  Id. ¶ 37. 
56.  Id. at 7, ¶ 10 (although also noting that “there are currently two proposals before the 
Council for Directive relating to the winding up of banks and other credit institutions and of 
insurance companies”), and 15, ¶ 38. 
57.  Id. at 13 (“in the sense that the centre of the debtor’s main interests in in a Member 
State, and only as between Member States”). 
58.  Id. at 15, ¶ 38 (although noting that “there may still be an advantage where the 
Convention assists a United Kingdom parent company in protecting its interest as a 
shareholder in a company the subject of main proceedings in another Member State”). 
59.  Id. at 9, ¶ 19. 
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financial markets possessed under then-current British insolvency 
laws and but that might have been lost under the draft Convention.60 
Still, the Hoffman Report raised a shorter list of complaints 
about the third draft Convention than had been raised about the EEC 
Draft.61 What most seemed to irk the Select Committee was the fact 
that an explanatory report on the draft Convention, which had been 
commissioned by the Presidency of the European Union, was 
unfinished by the time of the writing of the Hoffman Report and 
unlikely to be completed by the time six-month window for accession 
to the draft was closing.62 Although the Select Committee states 
clearly in its report that “[t]he text [of the Convention] is now fixed,” 
meaning “that it is not open to us to devise or speculate on changes” 
to its terms, nonetheless the Report noted that several of the 
substantive concerns raised by them might have been resolved by 
clarifying language in the as-of-then unfinished explanatory report.63 
The Select Committee would have preferred to know that the 
explanatory report had reflected its concerns before making its 
recommendation to Parliament, but that was impossible. This 
“procedural” concern seems the most likely explanation for the failure 
of the Select Committee to recommend agreement to the terms of the 
third draft Convention. 
In the end, the Hoffman Report concludes only that “the 
proposed Convention on Insolvency Proceedings raises important 
questions,” but not that the British government should sign the 
Convention. Indeed, the Report remarks that: 
[t]he Committee believes that all States are entitled to know, with 
a reasonable degree of certainty, to what it is they are being 
asked to sign their names. The six months provided by the 
Convention would normally be long enough. But the present 
position is different, in that the Explanatory Report, which would 
offer a way to remove much uncertainty, has yet to be finalized.64 
                                                                                                                                  
60.  Id. at 16, ¶ 39. 
61.  The Hoffman Report is only a few short pages long, while the Cork Report 
comprised hundreds of pages of analysis, much of it critical. In the end, however, the Cork 
Report recommended British accession to the EEC Draft mostly on pragmatic grounds. See 
generally Hoffman Report, supra note 52; Cork Report, supra note 20.   
62.  This explanatory report was subsequently completed. See Etienne Schmit & Miguel 
Virgos, Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings, DRS 8 (CFC) (May 3, 1996). 
63.  Hoffman Report, supra note 50 at 15, ¶ 35. 
64.  Id. at 16, ¶ 41. 
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This language might easily be ignored as demonstrating no more than 
the preferences of the select committee for dotting i-s and crossing t-s 
in the preparation of international legislation. Except that the 
penultimate paragraph of the Hoffman Report also invites 
reexamination of the transnational politics of the European Union.65 
Ultimately, the United Kingdom used its position as the last nation to 
sign on to the draft Convention as a point of leverage. 
That the United Kingdom ultimately refused to sign the draft 
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is well known. Although 
ostensibly declining to sign onto the draft Convention in protest over 
prohibitions on trade in British beef due to fears of mad cow disease, 
its refusal might instead have involved an unrelated ongoing dispute 
concerning the “Gibraltar situation.”66  
Closer examination of the record shows that the Hoffman Report 
itself seems to invite the inaction ultimately taken by the British 
government: 
If the deadline in the present text passes, that would not prevent 
the Convention coming into being at a later date. It would hardly 
be in the interest of Member States who support the Convention 
to sacrifice it altogether rather than accept some delay. The 
Government should not sign the Convention in advance of their 
being satisfied, following consultation and consideration, that 
technical uncertainties have been removed.67 
Prime Minister John Major referred only to British trade interests in 
declining to sign the third draft convention but Lord Hoffman’s 
political assessment that the convention might not be lost if left 
unsigned referred more to the Select Committee’s peak over the 
failure of the European Presidency to complete the explanatory report 
on time rather than over British beef. 
                                                                                                                                  
65.  Id. 
66.  GABRIEL MOSS, IAN FLETCHER, AND STUART ISSACS, MOSS, FLETCHER AND 
ISAACS ON THE EU REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS (3d ed. 2016); BOB 
WESSELS, EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: AN 
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, at ¶¶1.2-1.3 (3d ed. 2007). Gibraltar is a British Overseas 
Territory located on the southern end of the Iberian Peninsula. The Spanish Crown formally 
ceded the Gibraltar in perpetuity to the British Crown in 1713. Spain later attempted multiple 
times to recapture the territory. In 1966, the Spanish Government formally proposed to achieve 
the return of Gibraltar to Spain. The proposal was rejected by the British Government and by 
the Gibraltarians, which overwhelmingly voted to remain under British sovereignty in a 
referendum held in 1967.   
67.  See Hoffman Report, supra note 50 at 16, ¶ 41. 
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Regardless of the precise motivation of the British government 
in failing to accede to draft EU Convention, the United Kingdom 
failed to sign on and as a result the third draft EU Convention also 
failed to enter into force. 
D. The (Original) EU Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency 
The Select Committee had been right about Europe’s 
unwillingness to throw away a perfectly good draft convention even 
though it had failed to enter into effect on the basis of the UK failure 
to join. Undeterred by the failure of the third draft convention to enter 
into force, Germany and Finland quickly redrafted it to conform to the 
requirements of a regulation under European law.68 This “new” EU 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings differed from the third draft 
EU Convention on the same subject mostly in form; on the substance, 
it was nearly identical to the draft Convention in nearly every detail.69 
Within a short time, [15] Member States had agreed to be bound to 
the terms of the EU Insolvency Reg, including Great Britain. By 
2002, the EU Reg entered into force, governing cross-border 
insolvency practice within the European Union. 
Like the third draft Convention on the same topic, the EU 
Insolvency Reg provides for automatic recognition of and 
coordination among insolvency proceedings pending in EU Member 
States. In addition, it includes rules governing the jurisdiction of 
contracting Member States’ courts’ to open insolvency proceedings, 
and the effect of insolvency proceedings once commenced. Thus, 
with its 55 articles, 6 chapters and 3 annexes, the EU Reg included (i) 
rules of jurisdiction, (ii) rules on the law applicable to insolvency 
proceedings and the disputes arising in those proceedings, as well as 
(iii) rules governing the recognition and enforcement of orders 
entered in such proceedings. While several of the Recitals preceding 
the Regulation differ from similar language in the draft Convention, 
the EU Reg is virtually indistinguishable to the substance of the third 
draft convention. 
                                                                                                                                  
68.  Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Finland with a 
view to the adoption of a Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings, Procedure 
1999/0806/CNS (May 26, 1999).   
69.  The original EU Insolvency Regulation was meant to be (and was) substantively 
identical to earlier draft EU Convention.  See KLAUS PANNEN (ED.), EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY 
REGULATION, INTRODUCTION, at 11 (2007). 
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In small ways, however, the third draft Insolvency Convention 
and original EU Insolvency Reg differ, and many of these differences 
track substantive concerns that had been raised in the Hoffman Report 
on the Convention.70 When the EU Reg was first published but not 
yet binding on the UK, the Select Committee of the House of Lords 
made sure that these concerns had been resolved in the EU Insolvency 
Reg consistent with what it understood to be British interests.71 
Despite these small changes, the British government did not 
succeed in redressing other issues that had been raised in the Hoffman 
Report. The EU Reg is not an explicitly corporate-reorganization-
friendly document. It refers to insolvency proceedings as 
administered by liquidators. It permits the filing, and the recognition 
and enforcement, of both a “main” proceeding in a debtor’s COMI 
but also “secondary” proceedings potentially wherever a debtor is 
established. Like the preceding third draft Convention, the original 
EU Reg does not explicitly define what constitutes a debtor’s “centre 
of main interests” (its COMI).72 On its face, it only applies to a single 
corporate actor and, thus, does not resolve the issue of corporate 
groups. The United Kingdom signed the EU Insolvnency Reg, and the 
Reg entered into effect on May 2002. 
                                                                                                                                  
70.  These differences are all found in the Recitals to the EU Reg. Balz, supra note 22. 
Since recitals were not a part of the format of a convention, new points could have been added 
without opening up the articles themselves for revision. 
71.  See House of Lords, Select Committee on European Communities, Letter from Lord 
Tordoff, Chairman of the Committee, to Dr. Kim Howells MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry (Nov. 4, 
1999), available at  https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldselect/ldeucom/21/
2129.htm [hereinafter “Tordoff Letter”]. In the Tordoff Letter, the Chair of the Select 
Committee asked: (i) whether various “technical points (concerning floating charges, netting 
agreements and settlement arrangement in financial markets)” had been expressly resolved in 
either the recitals or provisions of the EU Reg; (ii) whether the question of the applicability of 
the EU Reg to Gibraltar had been resolved; (iii) whether the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
could comment on “the ability of the United Kingdom to enter into agreements (Treaties, 
Conventions, etc.) with Third States on insolvency matters”; (iv) whether Ireland and Denmark 
would be parties to the EU Reg; and (v) whether the Government could share with the Select 
Committee what it had learned about practitioners’ reactions to the EU Reg. An exchange of 
correspondence results in Lord Tordoff’s satisfaction. See id.  
72.  COMI is not defined in the EU Reg, but Art. 3(1) presumes that a corporate 
debtor’s COMI exists at the place of its registered office (that is, its place of incorporation); 
see also EU Reg, supra note 1, Preamble ¶ 13. 
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E. British Influence on the EU Regulation on Cross-Border 
Insolvency 
Spanning nearly forty years and producing three draft 
conventions before settling on a European-wide regulation, these 
negotiations more reflect political compromise than coalescence 
around a singular jurisprudential vision for a unified market approach 
to the problem. Although negotiations on the EU Insolvency Reg 
have conventionally been understood as involving compromise 
between common law and civil law approaches to insolvency 
practices, the preceding analysis also shows that these negotiations 
involved compromise of British interests. The British government did 
not succeed in resolving in diplomatic negotiations criticisms of the 
EU Reg, which had been raised in testimony and reports within the 
British government. 
This analysis surprisingly reveals that the Cork and Hoffman 
Reports criticized the European proposals on coordinating cross-
border insolvency proceedings on very similar grounds, although 
these reports addressed distinctly different draft conventions. Despite 
these criticisms, the British government agreed to be bound to the EU 
Insolvency Reg. Its last-minute political pretexts for objecting to the 
third draft Insolvency Convention had almost caused forty years of 
work to get wasted. The British government achieved small victories 
in the conversion of the third draft Convention to a regulation, but not 
more.73 
Given that the text of the original EU Insolvency Reg was the 
product of compromise, its meaning was in important ways left for 
courts to interpret. It is to this judicial record that Part II next turns. 
                                                                                                                                  
73.  See generally Tardoff Letter, supra note 71.  I leave for another day the effects of 
the EU Reg, and particularly critiques of the EU Reg, on domestic insolvency legislation 
within the United Kingdom, but note briefly that the Cork Report suggested that all UK 
insolvency law should be reviewed, subsequently resulting in enactment of the 1986 
Insolvency Act; that based on his involvement in review of the EEC Draft, Sir Cork was clear 
that modern insolvency law should enable the rescue of a failing corporation rather than 
simply its liquidation and also that this law should provide statutory grounds for recognition of 
insolvency proceedings outside the United Kingdom but inside the former Commonwealth 
countries, resulting in section 426 of the 1986 Insolvency Act. The remedy of administrative 
receivership fell into disuse also perhaps as a result of the EU Reg’s failure to include that 
proceeding within its scope, and ultimately was repealed in the 2002 Enterprise Act. 
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III. BRITISH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU INSOLVENCY 
REGULATION 
Although British influences on the original EU Insolvency Reg 
were undeniably important in the drafting of this text, British 
diplomats did not dominate negotiations on European cross-border 
insolvency coordination—appropriately so, since European Union 
requires European consensus. Nonetheless, British actors did have 
enormous impact after the original Regulation went into effect. 
To a large degree, this impact was the consequence of the unique 
attributes of British courts. By 2002, when the original EU Insolvency 
Reg first entered into effect, British courts already had long 
experience in coordinating foreign insolvency practice given British 
imperial history. British courts’ early nineteenth century instincts 
toward universal recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings would 
certainly have extended to proceedings arising within the British 
Empire.74 The Insolvency Act of 1914 governed insolvency 
proceedings arising anywhere in the Empire. This “Imperial 
universalism” continued after the fall of British Empire after WWII 
and was mostly re-codified in the Insolvency Act of 1986.75 
This influence was also the consequence of how British courts 
historically had interacted with the insolvency practitioners that 
effectively ran companies once a company accessed an insolvency 
proceeding. In the context of administrative receiverships, receivers 
were allowed broad discretion to resolve a floating charge after an 
event of default.76 British administrators and liquidators also 
exercised a great deal of discretion under the supervision of British 
courts.77 
Finally, this influence was also the consequence of the state of 
British insolvency law in 2002. The Insolvency Act of 1986 had 
substantially reformed British insolvency law. It included a statutory 
direction for British courts to cooperate with insolvency courts in a 
                                                                                                                                  
74.  See e.g., Stewart v. Auld, (1851) 13 D. 1337 (recognizing an insolvency proceeding 
initiated in Australia); see also Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 2510; Hoffman Report, supra note 
50, at 8-10. 
75.  See Insolvency Act of 1986, section 426 (UK), available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/section/426.   
76.  See ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 346-52 (4th ed. 
2011); See also Hoffman, supra note 30, at 2507-08; Hoffman Report, supra note 50, at 15, ¶ 
37. 
77.  See GOODE, supra note 76, at 150-56 (liquidators’ powers) & 447-66 
(administrators’ powers).  
2017] UK AND EU INSOLVENCY RECOGNITION 1395 
broad range of former-Commonwealth countries. More importantly, it 
sought to create a culture of “corporate rescue” under British law. 
Although the administration procedure adopted under the Act was 
viewed by many to be too rigid to fully implement the goals of 
corporate rehabilitation, it was revised with enactment of the 
Enterprise Act 2002, streamlining the administration proceedings first 
adopted in 1986 but also effectively abolishing the administrative 
receivership.78 Although the Enterprise Act did not become the law 
until late 2003, and did not apply to floating charges created before 
application of the Enterprise Act, by 2002, when the EU Insolvency 
Reg entered into effect, British insolvency law was nonetheless 
viewed as far more reorganization-friendly than French or even 
German law on the topic.79 This perception was not limited to those 
from the United Kingdom. Continental bankers and manufacturers 
and service providers also shared this opinion and a few Continental 
companies demonstrated this preference by changing their executive 
offices or otherwise configuring their place of registration so that they 
could be reorganized under British law rather than some other 
Continental insolvency law. 
A. COMI and the Possibility That Presumptions Get Rebutted 
Both the Cork Report on the EEC Draft and the Hoffman Report 
on the third EU draft convention had criticized predecessors to the EU 
Insolvency Reg for applying to a single debtor corporation and its 
branch establishments across Europe, even though market practices 
commonly provided for pan-European businesses to be run through a 
group of corporations, many of them registered under distinct 
European corporate laws.80 Undoubtedly aware of this criticism, 
British insolvency practitioners did not feel limited by it. Instead they 
                                                                                                                                  
78.  See id. at 385-86; See, e.g., John Armour, Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walters, The 
Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations and Costs in Corporate Rescue Proceedings 
(Dec. 2006)(reporting to the UK insolvency service), https://www.researchgate.net/publication
/242155506.  
79.  Although in 1994 the German Bundestag substantially revised their insolvency laws 
to adopt a “unitary” system that would have enabled corporate rescue and reorganization, Balz 
supra note 22 at 492 n.23, this reform legislation was viewed as less reorganization friendly 
than UK insolvency laws at that time. See generally Müge Adalet McGowan and Dan 
Andrews, Insolvency Regimes and Productivity Growth: A Framework For Analysis, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers No. 1309 (July 1, 2016), available at 
https://www.oecd.org/eco/insolvency-regimes-and-productivity-growth-a-framework-for-
analysis.pdf. 
80.  See supra Part I.C. 
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pushed, almost from the moment the EU Reg entered into effect, for a 
construction of the articles of the Regulation to resolve these 
complaints. In doing so, these insolvency practitioners were simply 
viewing the open-ended standards embedded in the EU Reg as 
opportunities for argument rather than as sources of uncertainty, 
which is to say that they were engaged in the sort of inventive 
advocacy that the common law invited. 
The first such case, In re BRAC Rent-A-Car International, Inc., 
did not involve a pan European group of corporations, but instead a 
company incorporated under US law – Delaware law, to be precise.81 
An administration order against BRAC was entered by the High Court 
in London, although the debtor was a Delaware corporation. Italian 
judgment creditors objected. Although before the EU Reg entered into 
effect in May 2002 the Insolvency Act of 1986 would not have 
countenanced the filing of the Delaware corporation, Mr. Justice 
Lloyd found that under Art. 3 of the EU Reg it had jurisdiction 
because the company’s “centre of main interests” were in England 
and not the United States: 
The Company is incorporated in Delaware, and has its registered 
address in the United States. However, that is not an address 
from which it trades, and it has never traded in the US. Its 
operations are conducted almost entirely in the United Kingdom. 
82 
The court, thus, held that the EU Reg extended its jurisdiction beyond 
that previously available under the Insolvency Act of 1986 by virtue 
of Art. 3’s sole jurisdictional focus on whether the “centre of the 
debtor’s main interests is within that Member State, as is the case in 
this instance.”83 
But while the most controversial aspects of this case were the 
extra-territorial extension of the EU Reg outside Europe to apply to a 
company that had been incorporated in a “third country” – the United 
States, BRAC Rent-A-Car also demonstrated the route through which 
the EU Reg might cover an entire group of corporations within 
Europe. This “route” was evident from the facts of the case. For not 
only did the High Court of London find that the Delaware corporation 
                                                                                                                                  
81.  In re BRAC Rent-A-Car Int’l Inc. [2003] EWHC (Ch) 128 (7 Feb 2003). For the 
full text of this unpublished opinion, see https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/
media/Re_Brac_Rent_a_Car.pdf. 
82.  Id. ¶ 4. For further description of the “Englishness” of the debtor, see id. ¶ 5. 
83.  Id. ¶ 31. 
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conducted its operations “almost entirely in the UK,” it also 
mentioned that these operations extended throughout Europe and 
elsewhere through a group of corporations. In describing BRAC Rent-
A-Car International, Inc., it noted that: 
[The Company] was until recently part of the Budget group, and 
its business is that of managing the European, Middle Eastern 
and African operations formerly carried on by that group. It has 
subsidiaries in many Western European countries, each of which 
has, in turn, agreements with various franchisees. In countries 
where the company does not have a subsidiary it enters into 
franchise agreements directly with franchisees.84 
BRAC Rent-A-Car involved not just a Delaware corporation whose 
“centre of main interests” was in England.  It was also a parent of a 
corporate group whose “centre of main interests” was in England. 
Following in the wake of BRAC Rent-A-Car, British barristers 
argued before British courts that the Regulation’s presumption that a 
corporate subsidiary’s COMI was located in its place of registration 
should be rebutted in favor of a finding that the subsidiary’s COMI 
was identical to that of its parent corporation, an English company 
whose head office and management and books and records were also 
located in England.85 For example, three months after BRAC Rent-A-
Car, the Leeds High Court upheld petitions for administration orders 
submitted on behalf of a pan-European group of insolvent companies 
in In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd.86 The petitions involved not only the 
English parent company, which was itself a subsidiary of an 
American corporation, but also several subsidiaries of that English 
company, one registered in France and two in Germany.87 The Leeds 
court concluded that it had jurisdiction to enter administration orders 
involving the French and German subsidiaries so long as their “centre 
of main interests” were in England under Art 3(1) of the EU Reg,88 
and found that the “centre of main interests” of the subsidiaries was in 
                                                                                                                                  
84.  Id. ¶ 4. 
85.  For a case holding that Art. 3 of the EU Insolvency Reg enabled the London High 
Court of Justice to assert jurisdiction over an administration order sought by an unregistered 
company which could be wound up under the Insolvency Act of 1986, see In re The Salvage 
Association [2003] EWHC 1028 (Ch), Case No. 2664 of 2003 (May 2003). 
86.  In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd & Others [2003] B.C.C. 562 (16 May 2003). For extensive 
discussion of Daisytek, see Samuel Bufford, International Insolvency Case Venue In The 
European Union: The Parmalat And Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429 
(2006). 
87.  Daisytek, supra note 86, ¶ 2. 
88.  Id.. ¶ 12. 
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Bradford, England.89 Specifically, the court found that ISA 
International plc performed the “head office” functions for the 
corporate group. It “has negotiated supply contracts with major 
suppliers,” and “given guarantees to major suppliers” and other trade 
creditors.90 And because the “centre of main interests” of the French 
and German subsidiaries were in Bradford, England, the 
administration orders were entitled to automatic recognition across 
Europe under Art 16 of the EU Insolvency Reg. 
There was one practical difficulty with such an argument, and 
that is that the English administrators in Daisytek found that they 
needed to convince the creditors and courts in France that the COMI 
of the French subsidiary was England not France.  This construction 
of the EU Insolvency Reg was not immediately convincing to the 
Pontoise District Commercial Court.91 The District Commercial Court 
opened a main insolvency proceeding in France for the French 
subsidiary in the Daisytek corporate group, although a main 
proceeding governing the French subsidiary had already been opened 
in Leeds, England.92 This was exactly the sort of result that the EU 
Insolvency Reg sought to prevent, but the French court viewed the 
English decision “as tantamount to a denial of the concept of 
corporate legal personality” on the grounds that “the concept of a 
group does not have any legal implications and each of the companies 
in the group has separate legal personality.”93 On appeal, the cour 
d’appel in Versailles reversed, however, concluding that the High 
Court of Justice in Leeds, England had sufficient jurisdiction to open 
insolvency proceedings concerning the French subsidiary based on 
that court’s finding that the French subsidiary’s “centre of main 
interests” was situated in England and not in France, its place of 
registration.94 
                                                                                                                                  
89.  Id. ¶ 3 (holding that “the evidence shows that the trading companies in the group 
are managed to a large extent from Bradford and that they are managed and controlled as a 
group so that the activities of the group companies throughout Europe are coordinated by the 
head office in Bradford”). 
90.  Id. ¶ 4. 
91.  See Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SA, 2003 WL 22936778, Cour’ d’appel 
[CA][regional court of appeal] Versailles, civ. (Sept. 4, 2003).   
92.  Id. at 111. 
93.  Id. at 114. 
94.  See Bufford, supra note 86, at 462 (concluding that the Versailles cour d’appel 
“found that the Leeds court had validly opened a main proceeding for Daisytek-France, and 
that, pursuant to the provisions of the EU Regulation, no French court had jurisdiction to open 
a subsequent main proceeding for the company, and that the decision of the Pontoise 
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The support of the Versailles cour d’apel in ISA Daisytek SAS 
ensured that British courts’ treatment of pan-European corporate 
groups would, if the evidence supported it, continue to involve 
findings that companies not registered under any UK law were 
nonetheless within the jurisdiction of British courts because their 
“centre of main interests” was situated in the United Kingdom.95 This 
result tentatively allowed corporate groups to reorganize under the 
gaze of the EU Insolvency Reg, particularly if members of a corporate 
group all filed in the United Kingdom on the basis of their COMI in 
common. 
Insolvency practitioners and commentators were not perfectly 
comfortable with this state of the law. Premising jurisdiction on a race 
to the courthouse places emphasis on the fleet-footedness of a 
company’s professionals, as well as on statutory hurdles preventing 
the commencement of an insolvency proceeding in some countries.  
For example, Italian lawyers and Italian courts learned when they lost 
their arguments that the COMI of a member of the Parmalat corporate 
group should be viewed as Italian despite its Irish registered office.96 
In In re Eurofood, the European Court of Justice upheld the Irish 
Supreme Court’s refusal to rebut the presumption that an Irish 
subsidiary’s COMI was situated in Ireland, its place of registration, 
and not Italy, the location of the Irish subsidiary’s corporate group 
parent, on a variety of grounds including the perceptions of third party 
creditors of the Irish financing subsidiary.97 
The focus in this article is on British influences on European law 
governing cross-border insolvency proceedings, and so I mention 
Eurofood only for its influence within the United Kingdom. Although 
the facts of Eurofood were distinct from those in ISA Daisytek SAS, 
aspects of this decision might have cautioned British barristers against 
making assurances that the European Court of Justice would see it 
their way in some subsequent case. Fortunately, British courts’ 
corporate-group-reorganizing construction of the COMI standard was 
tested again, after the ECJ’s decision in Eurofood, providing some 
comfort to British insolvency practitioners. In MG Rover, British 
                                                                                                                                  
Commercial Court to open a main insolvency proceeding for Daisytek-France violated the EU 
Regulation”). 
95.  Klempka supra note 91 at 112. See also Ci4NET.COM, Inc., [2004] EWHC 1941 
(Ch), Nos 556 and 557 of 2004 (May 20, 2004)(involving a Delaware corporation and Jersey 
registered corporation). 
96.  See, e.g., Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-03813. 
97.  See id. 
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courts opened an administration proceeding involving the Rover 
corporate group on the basis of a COMI-in-common among the 
British corporate parent and French and German subsidiaries.98 
Although French creditors again objected to the rebuttal of the French 
subsidiary’s place of registration as an indication of its COMI, this 
time the French Commercial Court declined to open a second “main” 
proceeding relating to the French subsidiary in the Rover group and 
the Versailles cour d’appel upheld this declination as a proper reading 
of the EU Insolvency Reg post- Eurofood.99 
B. Protecting Local Creditors Without Opening Secondary 
Proceedings? 
Both the Cork and Hoffman Reports also criticized the earlier 
draft conventions on which the EU Insolvency Reg was premised for 
focusing on liquidation rather than rescue of companies in financial 
distress.100 To some degree, the complaint had been addressed by 
express inclusion of British administration proceedings and voluntary 
arrangements within the scope of the original EU Insolvency Reg.101 
But the universalism that had been embraced in the EEC Draft and 
that was the approach to cross-border insolvency treatment most 
likely to facilitate corporate rescue was rejected in favor of the so-
called “modified” universalism by the third draft Convention and later 
the EU Reg.102 Commentators fretted, in particular, that the possibility 
that numerous secondary proceedings could be opened under the 
terms of the EU Reg would undermine corporate reorganization in 
Europe.103 
                                                                                                                                  
98.  MG Rover [2005] EWHC 874 (Ch.) 
99.  Public Prosecutor v. Segard (as Administrator for Rover France SAS), Cour d’apel 
[CA] Versailles, civ., 2006.   
100.  See supra Part I.C. 
101.  See EU Reg, supra note 1, Annex A. 
102.  See, e.g., Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: 
Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 
(2002). 
103. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 76. Goode puts the problem in this way: 
Creditors have a particular incentive to pursue secondary proceedings 
where the lex concursus governing their claims gives them better rights 
than they would enjoy under the law governing the main proceedings. For 
example, French law givens employees greater rights than English law on 
the insolvency of the employer, so that where main proceedings are opened 
in England against a French company, then in terms of the range of claims 
ranking for preferential status employees of the company will fare better in 
2017] UK AND EU INSOLVENCY RECOGNITION 1401 
Again, these concerns did not limit British insolvency 
practitioners when implementing the EU Insolvency Reg after its 
effective date. In one case, In re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, the 
British parent had sought and obtained an administration order and 
had joined in its request several of its subsidiaries, incorporated 
across several different European jurisdictions, all on the basis of 
their British COMIs.104 Once in administration, the joint 
administrators faced irate creditors in the member states in which 
some of the subsidiaries where located.105 These creditors argued 
informally, and probably rightly, that regardless of the Britishness of 
the subsidiaries’ COMIs, which could not at that juncture have been 
relitigated, some of the non-British incorporated subsidiaries had 
establishments outside the United Kingdom and inside Europe, and 
these establishments alone justified the commencement of secondary 
proceedings.106 Because the opening of secondary proceedings would 
have, as a practical matter, so delayed the reorganization of the 
corporate group as to thwart its rescue, the joint administrators made 
“oral assurances” at local creditors’ committee meetings “that if there 
were no secondary proceedings in the relevant jurisdiction then their 
respective financial positions as creditors under the relevant local law 
would as far as possible be respected in the English 
administration.”107 These assurances did the trick. Secondary 
proceedings were not opened and the European body of creditors of 
the corporate group supported the joint administrators’ proposed 
reorganization plan.108 
After the fact, the joint administrators sought judicial ratification 
of what they had informally promised, but the authority of the British 
court to enforce by the joint administrators’ oral promises was  
unclear. The EU Insolvency Reg specifies that the insolvency law of 
the main proceeding (that is the High Court of London and so English 
insolvency law) generally should govern distributions from a 
                                                                                                                                  
secondary proceedings in France than they would in main proceedings in 
England. Id. at 749.  
104.  In re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, et al. 2006 EWHC 1343 (Ch.). In making 
seeking administration orders for the European wing of the Collins & Aikman corporate group, 
the debtors were simply following in the footsteps of BRAC Rent-A-Car, Daisytek and Rover. 
See supra Part II.A. 
105.  See generally In re Collins, supra note 104.   
106.  See Id. ¶ 8. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. 
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proceeding under its scope rather than the insolvency law of the 
location of local creditors, at least where local creditors have not 
opened secondary proceedings in the member states in which the 
debtor had an establishment. But the joint administrators had assured 
the local creditors that they would receive no less from the Collins & 
Aikman estate than what they would have been entitled to under their 
local insolvency law. In the end, the British court ratified the joint 
administrators’ assurances on the ground that the English statute 
governing administrations grants administrators broad discretion in 
their roles, and that other rules of common law supported ratification 
of the assurances made on the grounds that breach of these would be 
dishonorable. 
That enforcement of the joint administrators’ assurances was 
necessary to accomplish reorganization of the corporate group in 
Collins & Aikman infuses the decision of the British court. But the 
EU Insolvency Reg was not premised on the desirability of promoting 
the rescue of a corporation (or corporate group) in financial distress. 
Indeed, its unfriendliness to corporate rescue culture was a complaint 
that had been registered when reviewing the desirability of acceding 
to the terms of the EU Reg (and to the third draft EU Insolvency 
Convention that preceded it). In reaching this conclusion, however, 
the British court found jurisdiction to ratify insolvency practices that, 
while not expressly prohibited by the EU Reg, were also only 
tenuously supported by it. Because the British court found it had 
discretion to ratify the assurances as a matter of English law, the court 
was not contravening the text of the EU Insolvency Reg. But because 
the court’s ratification of the joint administrators’ assurances was a 
matter of its judicial discretion, British insolvency practitioners could 
not be sure that the same result would follow in later cases.109 
IV. REVISING THE EU INSOLVENCY REG, WHILE MOVING 
TOWARD CONVERGENCE 
The original EU Insolvency Reg was drafted predominately to 
reflect laws focused more on the liquidation than the reorganization of 
corporate debtors, on debtor-corporations structured as singular 
                                                                                                                                  
109.  For discussion of the Collins & Aikman approach to secondary proceedings, see 
John A.E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcy 46 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 579 (2011); Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline 
in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 9 BROOKLYN J. COM. & FIN. L. 180 (2014). 
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entities rather than groups of corporations, and on the opening of local 
proceedings to allow for the protection of local creditors’ claims to 
assets situated outside a debtor’s “centre of main interests.” These 
shortfalls were apparent to the British government as it engaged in 
negotiations on each of the draft conventions preceding 
implementation of the EU Reg, but in weighing the costs against the 
benefits the decision was made to overlook these details in favor of 
the big picture: entry into a common European market. 
As with any legal document produced to achieve consensus 
among the interests of numerous national interests, the story of the 
drafting and production of the EU Insolvency Reg is only part of the 
story. All laws settle into practices, and often shift in their accepted 
meaning as later implemented and enforced.110 This EU Reg is no 
exception in this regard, which evolved both as practitioners and 
courts learned to work under within its express language and, over 
more than a dozen years, were required by one of its provisions to 
study past practices and consider revisions to this text. 
Thus, although the original EU Insolvency Reg was drafted with 
the roughly equal involvement of the European member states in 
1999, much of this settlement and resettlement occurred with British 
involvement at its core. Notwithstanding what many had perceived as 
limitations in the text of the EU Reg, over a dozen years, pragmatic 
British insolvency practitioners appearing before pragmatic British 
courts interpreted and implemented the EU Reg as a document 
enabling the rescue and reorganization of global corporate groups in 
financial distress. The story of the influence of the United Kingdom 
on cross-border insolvency practice within Europe is, in large part, 
then, a court-centered story that illustrates the importance of 
pragmatism, persistence and patience in the long-term project that is 
the implementation of the European Union. Over time, a corporate-
group-reorganization-friendly vision of the EU Insolvency Reg took 
hold, especially within the United Kingdom. Because this vision was 
more a function of British courts’ implementation of the EU Reg than 
the express language of its text, however, this settled practice might 
well have been unsettled. 
British actors were intently focused on solidifying the results 
they had received before British courts. Importantly, buried at the end 
                                                                                                                                  
110.  See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Settling and 
Concordance: Two Case Studies in Global Commercial Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS 75 (Terrence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds., 2015). 
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of the original EU Insolvency Reg was a boilerplate provision, Art. 
46, which provided that: 
[n]o later than 1 June 2012, and every five years thereafter, the 
Commission shall present to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Economic and Social Committee a report on the 
application of this Regulation. The report shall be accompanied if 
need be by a proposal for adaptation of this Regulation.111 
It was well understood that a report on practices that had developed 
under the EU Insolvency Reg could prompt European-wide buy-in on 
the results in British case law like BRAC Rent-A-Car, Daisytek, 
Rover, and Collins & Aikman. More importantly, revision of the text 
of the EU Reg could codify aspects of these judicial practices so that 
they would be more perfectly reflected “on the books” throughout 
Europe. But would the European Union follow where it had been led? 
By 2012, when by its terms the original EU Insolvency Reg was 
set for review and revision, much had changed within Europe. 
Beginning in 2008, a global financial crisis had threatened the 
economies of not only the United States but also Europe and even the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The United 
States rescued, through corporate chapter 11 reorganizations 
proceedings, two economically important automotive manufacturers, 
Chrysler and General Motors, and cobbled together repairs of its 
financial markets, providing a combination of tough regulatory love 
and TARP funding. By 2012, however, Europe’s financial crisis had 
grown to encompass sovereign debt problems, first in Iceland, then 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Hungary, Romania and 
elsewhere. Some of these sovereign debt problems were resolved with 
infusions of financial assistance from the IMF, European Central 
Bank and European Commission (together referred to as the Troika), 
but some European countries’ debt problems remain even today. 
Thus, the European Commission began its work on reporting on 
possible revisions to the EU Insolvency Reg “[a]t a time where the 
European Union [was] facing the biggest economic crisis in its 
history.”112 
By 2015, the European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union were convinced to promulgate an amended version of the EU 
                                                                                                                                  
111.  EU Insolvency Reg, supra note 1, art. 46. 
112.  European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Impact 
Assessment: Revision of Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings 
(Strasbourg Dec. 2012). 
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Insolvency Reg, and by late 2016 the European Commission had 
promulgated a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council aimed at harmonizing corporate insolvency law 
within Europe. The European Parliament adopted the revised EU 
Insolvency Reg in May 2015, thirteen months before a British 
referendum would call for the United Kingdom to exit from the 
European Union. The Commission finalized the proposed EU 
Directive in November 2016, five months after the Brexit referendum. 
A. [Revised] EU Regulation 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings 
Unlike the original EU Insolvency Reg, the revised version is far 
more reorganization friendly. Some of this reorganization friendliness 
is expressed indirectly, through definitions. References which under 
the original EU Reg were to the “liquidator” are replaced with 
references to the more neutral “insolvency practitioner.” The 
possibility of a debtor in possession is also recognized. The revised 
EU Insolvency Reg continues to divide insolvency proceedings into 
main proceedings in the debtor’s COMI and secondary proceedings 
where the debtor has establishments, but now both terms are 
explicitly defined.113 Moreover, the definition of COMI in the revised 
Insolvency Reg is identical to that applied by British (as well as most 
other European) courts. Judgments opening insolvency proceedings 
are entitled to automatic recognition, as had been true under the 
original EU Insolvency Reg, but now the revised version specifies 
that these effects “may not be challenged in other Member States.”114 
Although the revision continues to permit the opening of 
secondary proceedings,115 it also provides the insolvency practitioner 
in the main proceedings has the “right” to give an undertaking to 
avoid the opening of secondaries.116 This undertaking resembles the 
practices ratified in Collins & Aikman,117 but the revised EU 
Insolvency Reg also goes on to specify that any “court seised of a 
request to open secondary insolvency proceedings shall immediately 
give notice to the insolvency practitioner or the debtor in possession 
                                                                                                                                  
113.  See revised EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 6, art. 3(1) (defining COMI as “the 
place where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis and which 
is ascertainable by third parties”). 
114.  Id. art. 20(2). 
115.  Id. art. 34. 
116.  Id. art. 36. 
117.  Id. 
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in the main insolvency proceeding” so that the insolvency practitioner 
or DIP is given “an opportunity to be heard on the request” and 
presumably obtain an undertaking obviating such opening.118 To 
provide clarity on the priority of the preference set by actors in the 
main proceeding, the revised Insolvency Reg specifies that the giving 
of an undertaking is itself entitled to recognition of sorts; the court in 
the would-be secondary proceeding may “not open secondary 
insolvency proceedings if it is satisfied that the undertaking 
adequately protects the general interests of local creditors.”119 And, 
whether or not an undertaking is posted, the revised EU Insolvency 
Reg requires a court that opens secondary proceedings to “stay the 
process of realization of assets in whole or in part on receipt of a 
request from the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency 
proceedings.”120 The insolvency practitioner is also explicitly 
empowered to propose a restructuring plan that would bind 
participants in any secondary proceeding, so long as the restructuring 
is permissible in all affected jurisdictions.121 
The revised EU Insolvency Reg also addresses the question of 
corporate groups.122 Unlike British practices, which largely leave 
much to the discretion of a joint administrator in a corporate group 
with member companies with COMIs situated in England, the revised 
EU Insolvency Reg specifies in great detail the circumstances under 
which insolvency proceedings of members of a group of companies 
should be coordinated.123 
B. Proposed EU Directive on preventative restructuring frameworks 
Shortly after finalizing the revised EU Insolvency Reg, the 
European Commission also promulgated a draft Directive that looks 
to promote greater convergence in European insolvency and debt 
                                                                                                                                  
118.  Id. art. 38(1). 
119.  Id. art. 38(2). 
120.  Id. art. 46(1). 
121.  Id. art. 47(1). In this regard, the proposed EU Restructuring Directive is 
undoubtedly intended to prompt member states to adopt domestic legislation authorizing 
restructuring of this sort, so that participants in secondary proceedings would be so bound. See 
Directive 2016/723, of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventive 
Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of 
Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU, 
2016 O.J. L 141/19 [hereinafter “EU Restructuring Directive”]. 
122.  See revised EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 6, ch. V, arts. 56-77. 
123.  See id. 
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restructuring laws, and specifically convergence around a culture of 
corporate rescue.124 Although Continental insolvency laws in 
existence at the time the original Insolvency Regulation was 
promulgated mostly favored liquidation of insolvent businesses, the 
new Restructuring Directive proposes that member states adopt 
national legislation enabling and perhaps preferring the reorganization 
of viable businesses facing economic difficulty. Because both detailed 
and, as of yet, unfinished, I leave for another day description of the 
Restructuring Directive. Suffice to say for purposes of this article that, 
if finalized and implemented, the Restructuring Directive would result 
in the eventual convergence of European insolvency and pre-
insolvency laws so that they favored a rescue culture and were more 
in line with current UK (and also US) laws on the reorganization and 
restructuring of distressed companies.125 
V. THE EFFECTS OF BREXIT ON EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY 
PRACTICES 
All of this raises the question of: What next? What will cross-
border insolvency law look like after the United Kingdom leaves the 
European Union? 
Currently, the United Kingdom and all other EU countries 
except Demark are parties to the revised EU Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings, which came into effect in late June 2017. 
The proposed Directive on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks also 
became final in late November 2016, although by its terms does not 
require member states to adopt legislation to implement its terms until 
two years after the Directive enters into force. 
Since Prime Minister Theresa May recently initiated Brexit 
negotiations under Art. 50, it is reasonably certain that the United 
Kingdom will leave the European Union within the next two years, 126 
                                                                                                                                  
124.  See EU Restructuring Directive, supra note 121. 
125.  See id. See also text associated with supra notes 75-79 (discussing move toward 
corporate rescue culture in previous ten to twenty years). 
126.  It is less clear whether the United Kingdom will also leave or re-join the European 
Economic Area (EEA). If it re-joins the EEA, then the Directive on Preventive Restructuring 
Frameworks would govern. Directives apply within the EEA, even to countries that are not 
members of the European Union (such as Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland), but Regulations 
and Conventions do not. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 66. See also David Menzies, ICAS 
Director of Insolvency, Brexit: Implications for insolvency and restructuring, ICAS (Jun. 27 
2016), https://www.icas.com/technical-resources/brexit-implications-for-insolvency-and-
restructuring (“Whilst it is possible that either the Norwegian or Swiss models could be used 
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which would mean that, eventually,127 EU law would not govern 
recognition of insolvency proceedings commenced in the United 
Kingdom or British courts’ recognition of insolvency proceedings 
commenced in Europe.128 Some other law might get negotiated or 
otherwise put in place as a substitute. But what would that law look 
like? How effective would it be? 
There is discussion of a Great Repeal Bill, which promises to 
domesticate EU law as the law of the United Kingdom.129 Many think 
that the effect of the Great Repeal Bill would mean that the UK is 
bound, at least initially upon Brexit and the simultaneous enactment 
of the Repeal Bill, by the EU law to which the United Kingdom was 
bound on the day before Brexit.130   But although it is also possible 
that the Great Repeal Bill could succeed in binding the United 
Kingdom to EU law as a matter of British law, it would not bind the 
members of the European Union to reciprocate.131 After all, the Great 
Repeal Bill would only be a matter of domestic UK law. 
It might also be possible for the United Kingdom to negotiate a 
treaty with the member states of the European Union that provides for 
continuation of something closely resembling to the revised EU 
                                                                                                                                  
going forward, it is considered by most commentators that the United Kingdom will negotiate 
its own exit agreement with the European Union.”). 
127.  I say “eventually” because, presumably, proceedings started under EU law would 
continue to be governed by EU law even after exiting the European Union.  
128.  See, e.g., Brexit: What does it mean for restructuring and insolvency?, 
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (July 1, 2016), http://knowledge.freshfields.com/
m/Global/r/1574/brexit__what_does_it_mean_for_restructuring_and_insolvency_ (“Unless 
replacement legislation is given effect before Brexit, we expect that there will no longer be 
automatic recognition of UK insolvency proceedings in other EU member states.”). 
129.  See generally Parliament, House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 
The “Great Repeal Bill” and delegated powers, 9th Report, HL Paper 123 (March 7, 2017), 
available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/123/12302.htm 
[hereinafter HL Report on Great Repeal]. 
130.  UK Government, White Paper, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new 
partnership with the European Union, at 10 (describing effects of proposed “Great Repeal Bill” 
as “preserv[ing] EU law where it stands at the moment before we leave the EU”).  
131.  See HL Report on Great Repeal, supra note 129.  Thus, as far as cross-border 
recognition of insolvency proceedings, the effects of the Great Repeal Bill may not differ 
much from that of existing British law pertaining to the recognition of non-European 
insolvency proceedings – namely, the 2006 Insolvency Regulation implementing 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Section 426 of the 1986 Insolvency 
Act may provide for greater cross-border coordination, but mostly as applies to former 
Commonwealth countries. 
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Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings.132 The Council of Europe, 
whose membership is not limited to the EU member states, would be 
an obvious source for such a treaty.133 So might UNCITRAL, the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law (“HCCH”), or the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(“UNIDROIT”).134 
A treaty of this sort would be consistent with British interests. 
Regardless of what one thinks about the original EU Reg, the United 
Kingdom played a significant role in crafting the revised EU Reg and 
the United Kingdom should want to remain bound to its terms. Given 
that negotiations on the revised EU Reg and on the Directive of 
Preventive Restructuring Frameworks are so recently resolved, it 
would be reasonable to presume that the other 26 members of the 
European Union should also want the United Kingdom to remain 
bound to the revised Regulation and the new Directive.135 
But this common-sense conclusion will be difficult to 
implement. The history of the making of the original EU Insolvency 
Reg suggests that negotiations on such a treaty could take some time 
–hopefully not another forty years! 
Although the content of this new treaty would look to parallel 
that of the recast EU Insolvency Reg, which has already been written, 
and although there was a quick turnaround time between failure of the 
third draft EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings and the original 
EU Insolvency Reg, there are several new problems, all of which will 
be difficult to resolve.  
                                                                                                                                  
132.  See id. And depending on whether the United Kingdom also leaves the EEA, to 
negotiate a treaty through which the European Union and United Kingdom agree to be bound 
by the Directive on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks. Id. 
133.  For discussion of the Council of Europe, see Wassenberg, supra note 37. 
134.  For information on the HCCH, see Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, The World Organization for Cross Border Co-operation on Civil and Commercial 
Matters, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/home (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). For information 
about UNIDROIT, see History and Overview, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE 
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (last updated May 18, 2016), http://www.unidroit.org/about-
unidroit/overview. See also Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Contracts and Private Law 
in the Emerging Ecology of International Lawmaking, in CONTRACTING BEYOND BORDERS: 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL MARKETS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, (Gregoire Mallard and 
Jerome Sgard eds. 2016)(discussing emergence and work of HCCH and UNIDROIT as 
compared to that of UNICTRAL). 
135.  Personal Correspondence with Gabriel Moss (on file with the editors of the 
Fordham International Law Journal) (“The common-sense of all this seems to be that the UK 
and the 27 (or at least the 26, excluding Denmark), should reproduce the Recast Regulation by 
Treaty.”). 
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First, enforcement of the EU Insolvency Regulation depends on 
each member state accepting the jurisdiction of the European Union 
Court of Justice. But it is not at all clear that this sort of enforcement 
provision can be negotiated as a part of any newly negotiated treaty 
between the United Kingdom and European Union on the recognition 
of insolvency proceedings. For some time now, Prime Minister 
Theresa May has said that she would not accept the jurisdiction of the 
EU’s Court of Justice and it is difficult to see how the revised EU 
Insolvency Reg can work without enforcement.136  Currently, there is 
no alternative transnational court to delegate enforcement authority to 
in the same way as there are possible alternative lawmaking IOs for 
treaty drafting.137 But the question of the UK’s continuing submission 
to the jurisdiction of the CJEU after Brexit, even temporarily, is not 
an issue unique to the question of cross-border insolvency 
recognition, which could mean that the solution for recognition of 
insolvency proceedings takes on greater importance in diplomatic 
negotiations than one might think.  Just this month, important 
progress has been made on this issue, with the UK Government 
putting forward a White Paper on various proposals for enforcement 
and dispute resolution after Brexit.138  Given the newness of this 
proposal, there can be no certainty that it would meet with the 
approval of EU diplomats or that any tentative agreement reached on 
this issue would continue to exit by the time set for Brexit under Art. 
50. Nonetheless, the new White Paper’s appearance presents an 
important shift in the tone of the negotiations so far.  
That said, insolvency practitioners should not pop champagne 
corks just yet. Nearly since the Brexit referendum was first reported, 
there existed the substantial worry that the political situation within 
Europe would favor second-best solutions in Brexit negotiations with 
the United Kingdom so as to signal to other member states that 
exiting the European Union comes with substantial costs. It might be 
                                                                                                                                  
136.  Id. 
137.  It might be possible to negotiate a treaty between the United Kingdom and 
European Union that does not accept the jurisdiction of the CJEU to resolve conflicts raised by 
national courts’ interpretation of this treat, but that creates the possibility of conflicts between 
this new treaty and existing EU agreements in the recast EU Reg, which after all would 
continue in effect after Brexit among the remaining EU member states. This potential for 
conflict would be difficult to tolerate, long term. 
138.    See UK Government, Enforcement and dispute resolution: A Future Partnership 
Paper, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/639609/Enforcement_and_dispute_resolution.pdf.   
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perfectly consistent with the national interests of all concerned to 
negotiate a treaty on recognition of insolvency proceedings that 
closely resembles existing European law, but this issue is just a pin 
prick in the sea of substantive issues that will need to get resolved 
between UK and EU diplomats. So far, signals regarding the order in 
which things get decided do not suggest that the issues on which 
agreement ought to be relatively easy will get decided first. To the 
contrary, the easy issues may get decided last. 
In the absence of a newly negotiated treaty on cross-border 
insolvency, domestic UK law would govern, but could not provide 
resolution equivalent to that under the EU Reg.139 Whether by means 
of the Great Repeal Bill, or existing UK law providing for recognition 
of “foreign” insolvency proceedings, British courts could coordinate 
with and assist incoming cases – that is, insolvency proceedings 
commenced in Europe and seeking recognition from British courts – 
but these laws would not provide assurance of coordination on 
outgoing cases that have been commenced in British courts and that 
seek recognition and enforcement across Europe.140 Even in those EU 
member states that have enacted legislation to implement 
UNICTRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and there are 
only several of these countries, recognition would not be automatic 
and assured in the same way as under the EU Reg. Moreover, British 
law limits the effect of their Model-Law implementing legislation (the 
2006 Insolvency Regulation) so that it has no implication for the 
recognition and enforcement of insolvency related judgments.141 
UNICTRAL has been at work in patching this hole for several years 
                                                                                                                                  
139.  See, e.g., Graham Bushby & Ian G. Williams, Inside the “Brexit Bubble”: What’s 
Next for the UK?, XXXV, No. 9 A.B.I. JOURNAL (Sept. 2016)(“The ECReg gives automatic 
recognition to UK insolvency proceedings throughout the EU, and without access to it, 
reliance will have to be placed on each member state’s own laws, as was the case in the 
past.”). See also What will be the Impact of Brexit on Insolvency Proceedings?, LEXOLOGY 
(Oct. 5 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7828bfb8-feaf-4a7e-97cb-
cc5664f36e47; Brexit: Restructuring and Insolvency, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, (Feb. 16, 
2017), available at https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/brexit-restructuring-
and-insolvency.  
140.  See Brexit: initial considerations in the restructuring and insolvency market (July 
2016), CLIFFORD CHANCE,  available for download at https://financialmarketstoolkit.
cliffordchance.com/en/financial-markets-resources/resources-by-type/client-briefings/2016/07/
brexit---initial-considerations-in-the-restructuring-and-insolve.html (noting that, going 
forward, “any reasoned analysis for cross border deals will inevitably depend on the outcome 
of the exit negotiations, which may be swayed by matters wholly unrelated to insolvency”). 
141.  Rubin v. Eurofinance S.A.; New Cap Reinsurance Corp. v. Grant [2012] UKSC 
46; [2013] 1 AC 236. 
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and seems poised to promulgate a new Model Law on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments,142 
but enactment of legislation to implement one or both of these 
UNCITRAL Model Laws across Europe cannot be guaranteed and, in 
any event, also could take a substantial period of time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The negotiation that produced the EU Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings, which entered into force in 2002, was time-consuming 
(spanning nearly forty years) and complicated (involving three earlier 
draft conventions). Although commentators generally view British 
influence on the original EU Reg as important, my review of reports 
to the House of Lords and Parliament more emphasize flaws than lay 
out grounds for British support. Despite these early reservations, the 
United Kingdom joined in the EU Insolvency Reg. Later, British 
insolvency practitioners sought to construe the EU Reg in ways 
inconsistent with concerns that had been raised before its entry into 
force and thus convinced British courts to solve the problem 
diplomats failed to fix. Based at least in part on this experience, 
European (including British) diplomats mostly codified British 
practices in their recent agreement to revise the EU Reg. Ironically, 
after Brexit, Europe will be left with a recast EU Reg that is heavily 
influenced by British insolvency practices and a new EU Directive 
that is heavily influenced by British law. While post-Brexit the United 
Kingdom may succeed in continuing to be bound by the EU Directive 
on Restructuring Frameworks, it faces substantial impediments to any 
replication of the EU Reg, mostly because this Reg is reciprocal and 
is subject to enforcement by the European Union Court of Justice. 
There is a serious risk that the United Kingdom will lose the 
benefits of the revised EU Insolvency Regulation. Let’s hope that this 
risk gets resolved, and diplomats instead succeed in negotiating a 
new, similar treaty on cross-border recognition of insolvency 
proceedings across the Channel.  This resolution would be better for 
both the United Kingdom and the European Union. 
                                                                                                                                  
142.  See UNCITRAL Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments: 
Draft Model Law (Mar. 1, 2017), available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
LTD/V17/013/46/PDF/V1701346.pdf?OpenElement. 
